Species Transformation and Social Reform: The Role of the Will in Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's Transformist Theory by Testa, Camille
 
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
SPECIES TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE WILL IN 
JEAN-BAPTISTE LAMARCK’S TRANSFORMIST THEORY 
A THESIS 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of 






SPECIES TRANSFORMATION AND SOCIAL REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE WILL IN 
JEAN-BAPTISTE LAMARCK’S TRANSFORMIST THEORY 
A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
BY THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF 
Dr. Piers J. Hale, Chair 
Dr. Jennifer Davis 
Dr. Peter Soppelsa 
 
© Copyright by CAMILLE TESTA 2021 
All Rights Reserved.  
 !iv
Abstract 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck is well known as a pre-Darwinian proponent of evolution; however, 
comparatively little has been published on his views of human physiology and development. 
This paper argues that the will was of particular importance in Lamarck’s social commentary, 
and contextualizes his ideas in light of prevailing debates in France about the physiology of mind 
and morals and the future development of the French nation. The paper first examines popular 
misconceptions of Lamarck’s ideas about the role of the will in evolution, particularly those 
perpetrated by Georges Cuvier and Charles Lyell; then it analyzes Lamarck’s genuine argument 
that human physiology could be altered by manipulation of a person’s habits and milieu. This 
belief led him to treat natural transformation and social change as complementary forces, and the 
will was the linchpin in this linkage. Finally, the paper suggests that Lamarck’s theories about the 
role of voluntary action in evolution should be understood in the context of French national 
concerns about degeneration, social reform, and human perfectibility, which remained part of the 
French intellectual landscape throughout Lamarck’s life and career.  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Introduction  
 Where historians have paid attention to the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
(1744–1829) it has generally been to note his ‘transformist’ or evolutionary views. However, 
given that the study of the history of evolutionary ideas has focused largely, and perhaps 
disproportionately, upon the life and works of Charles Darwin (1809–1882), it will perhaps come 
as no surprise that the majority of scholars who have written about Lamarck have done so more 
in order to contextualize Darwin than to consider Lamarck in his own right. One result of this has 
been that the ideas that have been termed ‘Lamarckism’ or ‘Lamarckian’ have been framed in 
relation to those mechanisms of evolution that scholars have, at various times, wanted to identify 
as ‘Darwinian.’ Thus, while the mechanism of natural selection has been claimed as 
fundamentally ‘Darwinian,’ the mechanism of the inheritance of acquired characters has been 
defined as ‘Lamarckian,’ despite the fact that Darwin appealed to both mechanisms in his 
explanation of the formation of new species. It is significant that this distinction between what 
was properly ‘Darwinian’ and what was ‘Lamarckian’ was originally drawn in the 1960s, when 
biologists were concerned to highlight Darwin’s contribution to, and agreement with, how they 
then understood evolutionary biology.  Those aspects of Darwin’s theory that were deemed to 1
have been correct were identified as ‘Darwinian,’ while ideas that were not then in vogue in 
 Peter J. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution: Reinterpreting a Historical Myth (Baltimore: Johns 1
Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp.1–2; See also Robert J. Richards’s critique of Bowler’s ‘non-Darwn-
ian’ thesis, but agreement on the ideological function of defining ‘Darwinism,’ in his The Meaning of 
Evolution: The Morphological Construction and Ideological Reconstruction of Darwin’s Theory (Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.147. For more recent critique on this see Piers J. Hale, ‘Reject-
ing the Myth of the Non-Darwinian Revolution,’ Victorian Review, 41, 2, (Fall 2015): 13–18.
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biology were designated ‘Lamarckian,’ as if they had played no real role in Darwin’s thinking.  2
Indeed, this is still how Lamarckian evolution is presented in a number of current biology 
textbooks.  3
 So much for historians’ categories. To Darwin and his contemporaries, Lamarck and 
‘Lamarckism’ were associated with something quite different. Indeed, in the 1844 letter to his 
friend and colleague, the botanist Joseph Dalton Hooker, in which he first confessed his belief in 
transformism, Darwin made it quite clear where he stood vis a vis the Frenchman:  
“Heaven forfend me from Lamarck [sic] nonsense of a ‘tendency to progression’ 
‘adaptations from the slow willing of animals’ &c,—but the conclusions I am led to are 
not widely different from his—though the means of change are wholly so.”  4
Thus, for Darwin and clearly for Hooker too, Lamarck was associated not so much with the 
inheritance of acquired characters as with ideas of an inherent progressive development and 
organisms willing their own evolution. Further, and although Darwin does not mention this in his 
letter to Hooker, as Adrian Desmond has pointed out, Lamarckism was also associated with 
radical and Francophile revolutionary politics, and thus Darwin had reason beyond a claim to 
 This is in contrast to much of the literature on Lamarck from the early twentieth century, a time when 2
biologists and historians embraced the argument that evolutionary theory required aspects beyond the 
mechanisms then considered ‘Darwinian.’ Many of these scholars were proponents of an expanded, ‘Neo-
Lamarckian’ version of Lamarck’s arguments, or at least attested to the increased popularity of Lamarck-
ism and Neo-Lamarckism during this period, particularly in the US. For example, see Alpheus Spring 
Packard, Lamarck, the Founder of Evolution: His Life and Work (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 
1901), pp. 332–367; Marcel Landrieu, Lamarck, le fondateur du transformisme: sa vie, son œuvre (Paris: 
Société Zoologique de France, 1909); William Morton Wheeler & Thomas Barbour, eds., The Lamarck 
Manuscripts at Harvard (Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press, 1933), “Introduction,” pp. xiii–
xxxi; Erik Nordenskiöld, The History of Biology: A Survey (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1936, 
“Lamarck,”) pp. 316–330; and Louis Trenchard More, The Dogma of Evolution (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1925, “Lamarck,”) pp. 163–184.
 For example, see Mary Ann Clark et. al., Biology 2e OpenStax, (2018), p. 492.3
 Charles Darwin to Joseph Dalton Hooker, [11 January 1844], Frederick Burkhardt et al. (eds.), The Cor4 -
respondence of Charles Darwin, Volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1–3.
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originality to want to put some distance between his own ideas and those of Lamarck.  Among 5
Darwin scholars, therefore, Lamarck has too often been seen as merely one of Darwin’s 
forerunners; insofar as he explicated an early version of evolutionary theory,  he was on the right 6
track, but was led astray by his speculations. In the process, though, he did at least smooth the 
way somewhat for the greater man to come.   7
 In this essay, however, I want to consider Lamarck in his own right and in his own 
context, rather than in Darwin’s. In this endeavor I draw from a different scholarly literature, 
which includes those comparatively few scholars who have made Lamarck their focus. Goulven 
Laurent and Pietro Corsi, for instance, have each made valuable contributions and correctives to 
the literature on pre-Darwinian transformism and to our understanding of Lamarck’s place in it. 
In particular, they have usefully explored Lamarck’s place in a number of the French natural 
historical debates of the early nineteenth century. For example, in “Paléontologie(s) et évolution 
au début du XIXe siècle: Cuvier et Lamarck,” (2000), Laurent has argued that Lamarck’s work 
as an invertebrate zoologist was influential and well-known among French nineteenth-century 
 Adrian Desmond, The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical London 5
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); on the further political associations of evolutionary ideas 
see also Piers J. Hale, Political Descent: Malthus, Mutualism, and the Politics of Evolution in Victorian 
England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
 See Richard Burkhardt, The Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, M.A.: 6
Harvard University Press, 1977); Richard Burkhardt, “Lamarck, Evolution, and the Politics of Science,” 
Journal of the History of Biology, (1970), pp. 275–298; and Andrés Galera, “The Impact of Lamarck’s 
Theory of Evolution Before Darwin’s Theory,” Journal of the History of Biology, (2017), pp. 53–70.
 See, for instance, Bentley Glass, Owsei Temkin, and William L. Straus, Jr. (eds.), Forerunners of Dar7 -
win 1745–1859 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, [1959], 1968); and Madeleine Barthélemy-
Madaule, Lamarck the Mythical Precursor: A Study of the Relations between Science and Ideology (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982). In the early twentieth century, the conception of Lamarck as a forerun-
ner to Darwin was also invoked by some French historians, often using the precursor myth to argue that 
Lamarck’s theory was unjustly ignored prior to Darwin’s. For example, see Louis de Nussac, “Lamarck et 
le muséum d’histoire naturelle,” Aesculape, Vol. 12, (1912), pp. 64–68.
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paleontologists, and helped advance the cause of transformism. In The Age of Lamarck: 
Evolutionary Theories in France, 1790–1830 (1988), Corsi has made the case that Lamarck’s 
belief in species transformation was not wholly anomalous among his peers, and that he was 
neither universally criticized nor ignored, but worked largely within the mainstream of 
contemporaneous French science. Corsi emphasized Lamarck’s social and intellectual 
connections to his colleagues and the dissemination of his ideas by his students and those who 
attended his lectures, in contrast to the myth (which Lamarck himself perpetuated) of the solitary 
martyr to science.  Corsi and Laurent have brought much-needed attention to the ways in which 8
Lamarck’s transformist theory was propagated and discussed in Europe long before Charles 
Darwin had even put pen to paper, thus helping to shift historical focus away from Lamarck as a 
mere forerunner or precursor to Darwin. 
 However, for all its strengths in this direction, it remains the case that even the literature 
focused on Lamarck has neither thoroughly nor adequately addressed his investigations into 
human organization and the physiology of mind. In particular, historians of science have often 
minimized the role of desire and the will in his writing. For example, Richard Burkhardt pointed 
out that Lamarck only ascribed will to a select few, highly complex organisms, and therefore it 
“could play no major role in the general process of organic change.”  Robert J. Richards 9
similarly argued that Lamarck’s explanation of organic change was dependent on needs and 
habits, not the will, stating categorically that “Will, as he understood it and in its usual meaning, 
 See also Corsi, “Before Darwin: Transformist Concepts in European Natural History,” Journal of the 8
History of Biology, (Spring 2005), pp. 67–83; and Corsi, “The Revolutions of Evolution: Geoffroy and 
Lamarck, 1825–1840,” Bulletin du Musée D’Anthropologie Préhistorique de Monaco, (2011), pp. 113–
134.
 Burkhardt, Spirit of System (1977), p. 175. See also Jordanova, Lamarck (1984), p.55.9
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simply had no immediate role in evolution.”  Corsi characterized Lamarck’s ‘will’ as “simply 10
the phenomenal expression of a complex process of nervous fluid dynamics,” minimizing the 
role of desire.  Such arguments have generally been deployed against the notion that Lamarck 11
considered species transmutation writ large to be a consciously directed process, with the will 
merely the antiquated insertion of a psychic element into the fledgling biological sciences.  In 12
light of the fact that so many Darwin scholars took Darwin’s word on Lamarck believing that 
animals willed their own adaptations, to Burkhardt, Richards, Jordanova, and others, it bore 
repeating that Lamarck did not in fact consider the vast majority of organisms to be capable of 
any kind of willed control of their own development. 
 What I want to do here, however, is to move beyond this backlash against the ridicule 
that Darwin (and, as we shall see, the eminent comparative anatomist Georges Cuvier and the 
geologist Charles Lyell) heaped upon Lamarck and his ideas, to note that Lamarck did in fact 
believe that the role of the will was of particular importance. To make this case, though, and to 
get Lamarck right on this point, we need to shift the frame of the debate further. It is not 
sufficient to merely consider Lamarck’s transformism in its own right: we must do so in the right 
context, and for this we need to focus on his conception of human origins and development. 
Furthermore, we need to recognize that in tackling this subject, Lamarck sought not to make a 
contribution to evolutionary biology, per se, but to prevailing debates in France about the 
 Richards, “The Emergence of Evolutionary Biology of Behavior in the Nineteenth Century” (1982), p. 10
267.
 Corsi, “Transformist Concepts in European Natural History” (2005), p. 70.11
 For example, see J. Walter Wilson, “Biology Attains Maturity in the Nineteenth Century” in Marshall 12
Clagett (ed.), Critical Problems in the History of Science (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1969), pp. 401–18.
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physiology of mind and morals, and the future development of the French nation. In this context, 
the notion of progressive development and the will were not amusing asides that showed their 
author to be out of touch with contemporary debates in natural science, but rather were widely 
accepted as central concepts in a debate of national importance. In Lamarck’s system the will 
was a crucial link between his natural historical account of species and his concerns with humans 
in society. It appeared in his writing not because he was a lone voice carrying on a tradition of 
unscientific eighteenth-century vitalist conjecture, but because he was intensely interested in the 
ongoing debates about the possibility of guiding human progress and French national policy. 
Lamarck’s understanding of human physiology allowed him to identify what he believed to be 
the natural historical origin and the manner of development of moral agency, an approach that he 
used to stress the particular insights a naturalist might have into debates about society and moral 
reform that had occupied French political commentators since at least the mid-eighteenth 
century.  
 Here I thus provide a close reading of Lamarck’s works in order to facilitate a 
reexamination of his own ideas on the will. However, this is not merely a history of ideas. 
Rather, I go on from this to place Lamarck’s ideas about mind, morality, and human agency in 
the rich political and intellectual context of debate about the natural historical, social, and 
political state and development of the French nation. Thus, in part one I provide an account of 
the construction of the mythical Lamarck that has long been the subject of ridicule among 
English naturalists and their more recent historian descendants. As I have already suggested, this 
began with Lamarck’s contemporary, colleague, and rival Georges Cuvier, but was picked up and 
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amplified in England by Darwin’s mentor, Charles Lyell, and subsequently echoed by Darwin 
Hooker, and others in their circle.  
 In part two, I build upon the work of historians like Pietro Corsi, Robert Richards, and 
Ludmilla Jordanova, who have reexamined Lamarck’s transformist arguments and shown that he 
did not consider evolution in general to be a voluntary process. As mentioned, the work of these 
scholars has been an under-appreciated and important corrective to much of the Darwin-centered 
historiography. Having laid out this literature, I indicate where my study departs from its main 
conception of Lamarck’s understanding of the will. I flesh out the historical understanding of 
Lamarck’s theories by closely examining the ways in which he genuinely did invoke the will 
when discussing the natural historical connections he saw between physiology, morality, and 
society. It is in this section that I argue that Lamarck’s consideration of will and moral agency 
played a crucial role in his social and political commentary, thus locating both Lamarck and 
transformism within the context of ongoing concerns with human development and social 
change.  
 Finally, in section three I focus on how Lamarck’s comments on the physiology of mind 
and morals attempted to answer calls for social and political reformation and regeneration in 
France. I locate Lamarck within ongoing debates in natural history, medicine and physiology, 
and political philosophy, focusing on concerns over the progress or degeneration of the human 
species, and of the French nation in particular. Thus, while Lamarck’s theory of species 
transformation was certainly an important aspect of his thought, I argue that it was only one part 
of a much wider investigation into social change, moral reformation, and national development. 
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Part I. In Darwin’s shadow 
 Lamarck spent much of his career as a botanist, conchologist, and invertebrate zoologist. 
However, by 1844 it is clear that Darwin was invoking his name to imply something quite 
different. Writing to Hooker, Darwin had disavowed himself of all “Lamarck nonsense”—
namely a tendency to progressive development and the idea that animals could, over time, will 
their own change. As I have pointed out, Darwin’s characterization of Lamarck and his ideas has 
persisted in much of the historical literature, along with the related idea that Lamarck had some 
special responsibility for the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, while Darwin 
alone was responsible for a wholly different mode of speciation: ‘natural selection.’   13
 While my focus in this thesis is on the role of the will in Lamarck’s thought, the question 
of progressive development and the debate over mechanisms of organic change are both germane 
to this issue. For Darwin, “Lamarck nonsense” was convenient shorthand for a combination of 
all three ideas: a process whereby an animal could voluntarily perfect itself in response to its own 
wants and needs, eventually passing the new characteristics on to its offspring and thereby 
improving the whole species. Darwin was particularly influenced by his mentor the geologist 
Charles Lyell (1797–1875), and Lamarck’s eulogist, Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), in forming 
this idea of what ‘Lamarckism’ meant, and Cuvier’s, Lyell’s, and Darwin’s remarks have 
powerfully affected the historical view of Lamarck and his ideas. Lamarck has persistently been 
 This was in spite of the fact that it is well known that Darwin, in addition to many other theorists, had 13
proposed not only some form of the inheritance of acquired characters, but of natural selection as well. 
See “An Historical Sketch of the Progress of Opinion on the Origin of Species, Previously to the Publica-
tion of the First Edition of this Work,” in Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Se-
lection, or the Preservation of the Favored Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1872), 
pp. xiii–xxi.
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interpreted with reference to Darwin, limiting the portrayal of both Lamarck and his ideas to the 
parameters that Darwin’s understanding of them had established. 
 Lamarck’s comments on the will most likely came to Darwin’s attention via the second 
volume of Lyell’s Principles of Geology, which was published in 1832. In it Lyell echoed much 
of the criticism of Lamarck found in the éloge given by Lamarck’s former colleague and rival, 
the French naturalist Georges Cuvier.  There is thus a direct intellectual lineage from Cuvier’s 14
sarcastic misrepresentation of Lamarck’s mechanism of species transformation to Darwin’s 
misunderstanding of “Lamarck nonsense,” as found in his 1844 letter to Hooker.  
 A staunch and longtime critic of species transformation, in his éloge Cuvier had collapsed 
together the roles of desire and habit, claiming that according to his deceased colleague’s theory, 
“it is by the desire to swim that membranes form on the feet of aquatic birds; … by the desire to 
fly, that the arms of all birds become wings, and their fur and scales develop into feathers.”  15
While it was standard practice among naturalists to use the form of the éloge to criticize each 
other posthumously, Cuvier was particularly adept at doing so. His éloge of Lamarck is a striking 
example of what historian Dorinda Outram has characterized as the tendency to “celebrate an 
image of the natural philosopher as apolitical and asocial,” a strategy that permitted hidden, 
implied discussions of power and politics.  In this case, Cuvier’s depoliticized description was 16
then paraphrased by Lyell in his own refutation of species mutability, perpetuating the idea that 
 See Lyell, Principles of Geology, Vol. II (1832), pp. 1–22. See especially pp. 9–10.14
 Cuvier, “Éloge de Lamarck” Recueil des Éloges Historiques, Vol. III, (1861), pp. 198–199. Translation 15
is mine.
 Dorinda Outram, “The Languages of Natural Power: The ‘Éloges’ of Georges Cuvier and the Public 16
Language of Nineteenth Century Science” History of Science, (1978), p. 154.
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Lamarck had been little more than a backwards-thinking transformist whose view of nature was 
irremediably tainted by what Lyell referred to as “fictions as ideal as the ‘plastic virtue’ and other 
phantoms of the geologists of the middle ages.”  This reading of Lamarck was then passed 17
along to Lyell’s friend and mentee Darwin, as evidenced by the 1844 letter to Hooker in which 
Darwin denounced “‘adaptations from the slow willing of animals’ &c,” clarifying that his own 
belief in species mutability depended on entirely different means of change.  18
 As Michael Bartholomew has long since shown, Lyell was also alarmed that Lamarck’s 
transformism implied a progressive natural history of human intelligence and therefore also the 
capacity for voluntary action.  Lyell’s critique specified that Lamarck’s theory included a 19
“tendency to progressive advancement in organization, accompanied by greater dignity in 
instinct, intelligence, &c,” and that belief in species transformation ensured “the future 
perfectibility of man in his physical, intellectual, and moral attributes.”  While Darwin was not 20
troubled by this aspect of Lamarck’s theory, as we have seen, he did adopt Lyell’s concern, taken 
from Cuvier, regarding ideas about both an innate “tendency to progression” and organisms 
willing their own change.   21
 Lyell, Principles of Geology, Vol. II (1832), p. 11.17
 Charles Darwin to Joseph Dalton Hooker, 11 January 1844, Frederick Burkhardt et al. (eds.), The 18
Correspondence of Charles Darwin, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1–3.
 Michael Bartholomew, “Lyell and Evolution: An account of Lyell’s response to the prospect of an evo19 -
lutionary ancestry for man,” British Journal for the History of Science, (June 1973), pp. 261–303.
 Lyell, Principles of Geology, Vol. II (1832) pp. 16–17, 27. Original emphasis.20
 Charles Darwin to Joseph Dalton Hooker, 11 January 1844, Frederick Burkhardt et al. (eds.), The 21
Correspondence of Charles Darwin, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1–3.
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 As Pietro Corsi showed in his 2005 essay on transformist ideas in Europe before Darwin, 
Cuvier and Lyell were far from the only naturalists to propagate Lamarck’s name and variations 
of his ideas throughout Europe in the nineteenth century.  Still, it was largely through Lyell’s 22
critique that Charles Darwin formed his conception of Lamarck’s mechanism of species change, 
and Lyell and Cuvier both portrayed Lamarck in a similar fashion—namely, as an atavistic, or at 
least outmoded, system-builder whose empirical evidence was shaky at best, and who had failed 
to adapt to the new positive science of the nineteenth century.   23
 The result of this attitude was that while Darwin considered Lamarck to have reached a 
conclusion similar to his own regarding species malleability, following Lyell, he saw Lamarck’s 
mechanism of change as wholly unsuitable for proper science. Darwin’s erroneous evaluation of 
Lamarck’s theory was not only based on a misunderstanding of the role of the will in species 
transformation, but also demonstrated his lack of awareness that Lamarck was writing in the 
context of ongoing discussion in France that also engaged with with social regeneration and 
change.  
 Darwin’s limited view of Lamarck has led scholars to similarly treat the Frenchman as an 
early biologist and evolutionist, and to evaluate his success and significance on this terrain alone.  
Historians of science have long rejected a simple conception of Lamarck as the unfairly 
maligned ‘precursor’ to Darwin.  Nevertheless, existing literature on Lamarck’s ideas has 24
 Corsi, “Transformist Concepts in European Natural History” (2005), pp. 68–73.22
 On the proper roles of facts and systems in European science, see Appendix A.23
 For example, see Madeline Barthélemy-Madaule, Lamarck, the Mythical Precursor (1982).24
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generally focused on his role as a pre-Darwinian defender of evolutionary theory.  Where 25
Lamarck’s other interests have been noted, his physico-chemical theories have often been 
considered an embarrassing detraction from his more serious biological work, especially given 
his repeated attempts to refute Lavoisierian chemistry,  and although his discussion of human 26
physiology has sparked some interest in the extent to which he contributed to nineteenth-century 
debates about mind and psychology, scholars have noted that his ideas were often spread 
indirectly, via a student or critic.   27
 These aspects of Lamarck’s work are certainly important, and demonstrate that there is 
still much of significance in Lamarck’s work that merits further investigation, but comparatively 
little has been made of his interest in the connections between physiology, morality, and social 
reform. Consequently, the role of the will in his thought has been minimized and misunderstood. 
For Lamarck, the nascent science of biologie was bound up inextricably with his interest in 
social change and moral agency. Natural and social transformation had produced moral agency in 
humans and endowed them with free will, and thus the ability to change their own environments 
 For example, see Burkhardt, “Lamarck, Evolution, and the Politics of Science” (1970); Burkhardt, 25
Spirit of System (1977); Corsi, The Age of Lamarck (1988); Corsi, “Transformist Concepts in European 
Natural History” (2005); and Desmond, The Politics of Evolution (1989).
 For example, see Burlingame, “Lamarck’s Chemistry: The Chemical Revolution Rejected,” in Woolf, 26
Henrey (ed.), The Analytic Spirit: Essays in the History of Science in Honor of Henry Guerlac (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 64–81.
 For example, see Baertschi, “Diderot, Cabanis, and Lamarck on Psycho-Physical Causality” History 27
and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, (2005), pp. 451–63; Gissis, “Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to 
Humans,” in Wolfe, C.T. & O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied 
Empiricism in Early Modern Science (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. 211–39; Richards, “The Emergence 
of Evolutionary Biology of Behavior in the Nineteenth Century” (1982); Richards, “The Influence of 
Sensationalist Tradition on Early Theories of the Evolution of Behavior” (1979); and Robert M. Young, 
“The Role of Psychology in the Nineteenth-Century Evolutionary Debate,” in Henle, Mary, Julian Jaynes, 
& John J. Sullivan (eds.), Historical Conceptions of Psychology (New York: Springer, 1973), pp.180–204.
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and to develop their mental and moral capacities, facilitating the continual re-forming and re-
creation of society. 
 This much suggests that what is really needed is a thorough analysis of Lamarck’s ideas 
about the will, and the physiology of mind and morals upon which they were based, in the 
context of ongoing debates about social reform in France in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century. Whereas, since Robert Young's signal essay on Malthus and the evolutionists (1969),  28
Darwin scholars have sought to place Darwin’s work in its social and political context, this has 
yet to be done adequately for Lamarck. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to 
revisit and reframe what Lamarck actually said about the will. This will serve as an important 
corrective given that so much that has been written on this subject is misinformed or simply 
wrong, but it will also allow us to consider Lamarck’s ideas about the will in the context of 
French political and social reform.  
Part II. Lamarck in his own words 
 According to Lamarck, higher animals, like humans, had more organs and thus more 
faculties than lower ones, and the will had its origin in acts of judgment carried out by the organ 
of intelligence. While the process of species transformation could thus provide a history of the 
intellectual faculties, Lamarck’s investigation of agency and the will was grounded in his interest 
in human physiology. This aspect of his thought placed him within a tradition that was not only 
natural historical, but also medical—a connection I explore more fully in part three of this essay. 
In this section my aim is twofold. First, to make Lamarck’s ideas about the will clear, which will 
 Robert M. Young, “Malthus and the evolutionists: the common context of biological and social   28
theory,” Past & Present, (May 1969), pp. 109–45.
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then allow us to see how they fit into broader natural historical, physiological, and medical 
considerations of the human species in the context of French national debate. My second concern 
is the social implications of the capacity for voluntary action. Lamarck was not only interested in 
the will as a biological or physiological phenomenon within an individual organism; he also 
believed that it allowed humans to play an active role in their own ongoing species development
—to be agents of their own future. This idea should not be confused with the caricature of a 
water-bird willing membranes to form between its toes, as Cuvier and Lyell each mockingly 
suggested. Instead, Lamarck understood biological changes to the human species in concert with 
existing social and political conditions, and thus he believed that social reform and management 
of the environment were key factors in the ongoing development of the species. By emphasizing 
the importance of the will, my goal is to show how Lamarck discussed natural transformation 
and social change as complementary forces. It was by this linkage that he claimed that naturalists 
had a uniquely important perspective on social and political issues. 
i. Intelligence and the will to change 
 Like many naturalists of his day, Lamarck pursued medical studies after he left the army 
in 1766. Accounts of this period of his life are sparse, but one letter from his daughter, Rosalie, 
indicates that he studied medicine at l’école de médecin beginning in 1772, a date that is 
consistent with that given in the éloge delivered by Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772–1844) 
at Lamarck’s funeral on December 20, 1829. While Rosalie’s letter did not specify how long the 
course lasted, Geoffroy stated that Lamarck’s studies occupied him for the following four years, 
a claim repeated by the historian Marcel Landrieu in 1909. Unfortunately, though, Landrieu was 
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unable to find any record of Lamarck in the medical school’s archive.  However, the 1830 29
auction catalogue for Lamarck’s personal library includes more than two dozen texts on 
medicine, physiology, and anatomy, including several reference books from the 1770s.  While 30
Lamarck never practiced medicine, it is clear from these books that he was aware not only of the 
basics of anatomy and physiology, but of the broader discussions of the effects of climate and 
environment on physiological function. 
 Lamarck’s interest in medicine persisted throughout his career. For example, from 1799–
1810 he published his Annuaires météorologiques, a series of almanacs that he proclaimed were 
written particularly for the benefit of doctors. In 1797 he even sent two copies of his Mémoires 
de physique et d’histoire naturelle (1797) to the faculty of the École de Santé to keep in the 
school’s library.  Lamarck composed these texts as contributions to medical discourse because 31
he argued that the atmosphere and environment were in a constant process of exchange with the 
“économie animale,” a term adopted by French medical vitalists in the eighteenth century to 
express a monistic view of humans as both physical and moral beings.   The intimate rapports 32
 Landrieu relayed that the archives of the Paris Faculty of Medicine from the years predating the Revo29 -
lution had been lost, and the “Commentaires de ce qui s’est fait et passé de remarquable à la Faculté de 
médecine de Paris” in the Bibliothèque contained no record of Lamarck. Landrieu speculated that he may 
have been affiliated only with the Faculté’s “brilliant rival” l’Académie de Chirurgie. Landrieu, Lamarck, 
le fondateur du transformisme: sa vie, son œuvre (Paris: Société Zoologique de France, 1909), p. 25, n. 2.
 “Catalogue des livres de la bibliothèque de feu M. le chevalier J.B. Lamarck” (Paris: Imprimerie et 30
Fonderie de Fain, 1830). The books are grouped loosely by subject matter, and the overtly medical, phys-
iological, and anatomical texts appear on pp. 4–5, nos. 63–94. 
 The letter in which Lamarck provided this explanation, dated 29 floréal an V, appeared in the 1909 Bul31 -
letin de la Société française d’histoire de la médecine (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1909), n. 8, pp. 185–6.
 On l’économie animale and the Montpellier vitalists, see Bernard Balan, “Premières recherches sur 32
l’origine et la formation du concept d’économie animale,” Revue d’histoire des sciences, (Oct. 1975), pp. 
289–326; Charles T. Wolfe & Motoichi Terada, “The Animal Economy as Object and Program in Mont-
pellier Vitalism,” Science in Context, (2008), pp. 537–579; and Philippe Huneman, “Montpellier Vitalism 
and the Emergence of Alienism in France (1750–1800): The Case of the Passions,” Science in Context, 
(2008), pp. 615–647.
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between the physical and moral aspects made physics and meteorological observations 
foundational to good medical practice, which was itself considered more a moral art than an act 
of mechanical healing.  Lamarck continued to use the term “économie animale,” as well as the 33
related “organisation” and “organisation animale,” in every major text from the Recherches of 
1794 through the Système of 1820.  34
 In addition to his medical studies, Lamarck studied botany under the naturalist Bernard 
de Jussieu (1699–1777). Here again he was focused on the adaptation of certain plants to their 
environment and the apparent heritability of these acquired characteristics.  It was clearly in 35
light of extensive reading in fields that addressed adaptations to environment among both plants 
and animals that he solidified his belief in species transformation, which he had done by 1800. It 
is likely that he first theorized this in relation to his work with plants, but by the time he 
published the Philosophie in 1809 Lamarck clearly believed that the implications of the theory 
were of the greatest importance for humanity.  
 His interests in weather, physico-chemistry, and atmospheric fluids were thus much more 
than peripheral attachments to a proto-theory of evolution. Rather, he deliberately took all of 
these concerns into account as environmental factors as he sought to explain how humans had 
come to exist in their present state—physically, socially, and morally. As early as his Recherches 
sur les causes des principaux faits physiques (which, although published in 1794, was drafted 
 For example, see Lamarck, Annuaire météorologique de l’an XI (Paris: Maillard, 1803), pp. 7–8.33
 For this insight I am indebted to the text-searchable editions of Lamarck’s works maintained by CNRS 34
under the direction of Pietro Corsi, www.lamarck.net.
 For example, see Lamarck, “Jardin de botanique,” Encyclopédie méthodique (Paris: Panckoucke, 35
1783), Vol. 3, pp. 211–215.
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between 1776 and 1780), he had proposed that living bodies were shaped by the motion of 
certain vital fluids, namely electricity, caloric, and the magnetic fluid.  These fluids passed 36
freely between the environment and an individual’s body, meaning that the animal economy and 
physiology were always enmeshed in a larger process of material exchange and circulation with 
the outside world.  Inside the body, the fluids underwent “animalization,” and, having done so, 37
maintained the animal’s irritability and caused its vital movements. As the fluids flowed through 
the cellular tissue in response to the animal’s received impressions, they carved out new channels 
and “tubes,” eventually resulting in a more complex organization.  In more developed species, 38
this process eventually created an organ of intelligence, which was sufficiently complicated to 
carry out the judgments and deliberations necessary to will certain actions.  39
 Lamarck very deliberately claimed agnosticism on the topic of a soul or vital principle: 
“The only knowledge that we can acquire [of an exciting cause of organic movements] is, and 
always will be, confined to what we can glean from the study of [nature’s] laws; beyond nature, 
in a word, is only confusion and lies.”  In this way he distinguished himself from the ancient 40
philosophers, whom he accused of  “creat[ing] mere words, which could only be attached to 
 A more developed version of the “hydraulic model” appeared in Recherches sur l’organisation des 36
corps vivans (Paris: Centre de Recherche en Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques, 2001, 1802), see 
especially pp. 157–200.
 On the connection between Lamarck’s geological and physico-chemical views and his mechanics of 37
feeling and sensibility, see Snait B. Gissis, “Lamarck on Feelings: From Worms to Humans,” in Wolfe & 
Gal, The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Empiricism in Early Modern Science (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2010), pp. 211–239.
 See Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (London: Macmillan & Co, Ltd., [1809], 1914), esp. pp. 201–38
233.
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 355.39
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. II, p. 3. See also Lamarck, “Nature” (1818), pp. 343–99; 40
and Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), p. 8.
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vague and unfounded ideas” because they lacked the “positive knowledge” that could be 
generated by careful observations of nature.  Furthermore, he explicitly denied that matter itself 41
could possess the faculty of sensitivity.  Instead, it was only the being “in its entirety” that could 42
feel, a position that has led both Gissis (2010) and Bernard Baertschi (2005) to argue that for 
Lamarck, feeling was an emergent property.  Still, Baertschi assigned Lamarck to a 43
“materialist” camp, and indeed intelligence, will, and one’s sentiment intérieur were all material 
phenomena in the sense that Lamarck considered matter a necessary precondition for any such 
subjective experience. He considered the moral and physical domains to be ontologically distinct 
but intrinsically united; intelligent beings experienced not just physical needs and emotions, but 
moral ones as well. It was via these latter that humans could excite their own “will to action,” 
while the former simply resulted in automatic, involuntary acts.  44
 According to Lamarck’s conception of humans, the will was the most fundamental aspect 
of agency, as emotions could incite movement only indirectly. In order to act by their own power, 
whether voluntarily or involuntarily, animals needed an “intimate feeling of their existence,” or 
sentiment intérieur, which was a generalized sense of self that arose from the amalgamation of 
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. II, pp. 2–341
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, (1809), Vol. II, p. 252.42
 Gissis, “Lamarck on Feelings” (2010), p. 224; and Bernard Baertschi, “Diderot, Cabanis and Lamarck 43
on Psycho-Physical Causality,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, (2005), pp. 451–63. Looking 
at France in the eighteenth century, Timo Kaitaro has also discussed the argument that living organisms 
could possess certain vital properties that their material parts did not possess. For Kaitaro this argument 
was characteristic of French “vital materialism,” and occupied a middle ground between what is now 
called vitalism and emergentism. Kaitaro, “Can Matter Mark the Hours? Eighteenth-Century Vitalist Ma-
terialism and Functional Properties,” Science in Context, (2008), pp. 581–92.
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, (1809), Vol. II, pp. 294.44
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all their physical sensations.  Intelligent animals could even notice (apercevoir) this feeling, and 45
after deliberation and judgment could act by their “more or less free” will.  Voluntary action 46
was thus a kind of dialectic between the material body and the subjective experience, but it was a 
developmental relationship. This understanding of the moral domain was what led Lamarck to 
argue that “the moral feeling exercises in course of time a greater influence on the organization 
than the physical feeling is capable of working.”  His views on the will and moral feeling thus 47
drew from a monistic-materialist perspective, and were far more nuanced than Cuvier’s absurd 
portrayal of animals ‘willing’ their own organs into existence. 
 However, this is not to dismiss the importance of self-directed physiological change in 
Lamarck’s thought. After all, it was the repeated motion of the vital fluids that carved out and 
widened certain channels and tubes inside the physical organism, and the individual’s own 
thoughts and actions that directed those fluids. Habitually repeating the same actions, or living in 
the same environmental conditions, would thus re-form one’s physical organization, and such 
changes could be inherited. From “stale air” and malnourishment  to climate  to education  to 48 49 50
being forced to submit to authority —any aspect of one’s manner of living would eventually 51
make its mark upon the body. And Lamarck was quite clear that this process influenced the 
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, (1809), Vol. II, p. 256.45
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, (1809), Vol. II,  p. 313.46
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, (1809), Vol. II, pp. 291–247
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 160.48
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 114.49
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 383; Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), p. 284.50
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 399; Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), pp. 342–4.51
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intelligence, too, insofar as it was the product of a particularly complicated organization. “One 
observation that has struck me for a long time,” he wrote in his 1802 Recherches sur 
l’organisation des corps vivans,  
is that having remarked that the habitual use and exercise of an organ proportionally 
develops its extent and faculties, just as lack of use proportionally diminishes its strength 
… I noticed that of all the organs of the human body, the one most forcefully subdued to 
this influence … is the organ of thought—in a word, the brain of man.  52
 For Lamarck, then, ‘willing’ one’s own physiological change could simply mean slowly 
altering one’s own physiology by the deliberate cultivation of certain habits. While historians of 
science have been correct to detach Lamarck’s discussion of will and desire from his overall 
mechanism of species transformation, his account of moral character included the ability for 
intelligent animals—namely humans—to voluntarily and deliberately direct their self-
improvement. Furthermore, such self-development was not a peripheral or secondary concern for 
Lamarck’s biological studies. On the contrary, his interest in human health and well-being may 
have failed to produce a medical career, but it remained a motivating force throughout his life as 
he investigated the natural world and living organisms. And, as powerful as the capacity for self-
improvement could be on an individual level, Lamarck’s gaze was ultimately fixed even further 
afield, on the possibility for social reform and transformation. 
ii. Biological change as social reform 
 For Lamarck, the capacity for reason and voluntary action made humans the only species 
who might capitalize on knowledge of the natural world to ensure and direct their own social 
 Lamarck, Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivans (1802), pp. 125–6. Translation is mine.52
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progress. In Philosophie zoologique he listed, as primary circumstantial factors in organic 
variation, the climate, temperature, atmosphere, place, manner of living, and daily actions and 
habits.  Controlling or altering any of these factors would thus have physical effects on 53
individuals, who could then pass on these acquired physical characteristics to their offspring. 
Lamarck was no saltationist, but believed adaptations slowly and gradually accumulated over 
immense periods of time. Substantial physiological changes on a species level, such as the 
appearance of a new organ, could therefore take millennia, but the effects of habituation were 
apparent within an individual’s lifespan. These habitual changes were central to Lamarck’s 
consideration of how human society might benefit from the lessons to be learned from his 
transmutationist natural history. 
 As I noted above in subsection 1, Lamarck thought the brain was particularly susceptible 
to the effects of habitual actions and thoughts. He also believed that the physical organization 
was most malleable in youth, which meant that a person’s mental physiology would bear the 
imprint of their earliest experiences throughout the rest of their life. A habit or inclination that 
one persistently indulged as a child could eventually result in irreversible physiological changes 
in that individual.  Lamarck did believe, following P.J.G. Cabanis and the sensationalists, that 54
people’s predilections and penchants arose from their experiences and mileux, rather than being 
innate to the species. And he argued that even when a specific tendency was inherited, it could be 
reversed, provided the afflicted individual did not “strongly and habitually” exercise its 
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy (1914), p. 114.53
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy (1914), p. 370.54
 !22
corresponding faculties.  But the physiological imprints of childhood were nonetheless hard to 55
escape later on, even if the stiffer brain tissue of adults could be remodelled by the fluid effects 
of habitual actions. Lamarck’s argument was not an essentialist one, but he did see the possibility 
that certain traits might become somewhat fixed. That is, the effects of habituation and the 
environment could be constraining for individuals, even though the species remained 
physiologically malleable.  56
 While Lamarck hardly seems to have been any kind of political radical, he did discuss 
some social implications of his physiological arguments. For instance, he considered early 
education particularly important, as it would strengthen the intellect and direct people’s attention 
to their moral needs and well-being. Education was therefore more than just the acquisition of 
specific knowledge; it inculcated the habit of varying one’s thoughts, which stimulated the 
complex ideas and mental operations that led to the development of the physical, natural, 
political, and moral sciences.  In contrast, those whose circumstances forced them to occupy 57
every day with “the same ideas, doing the same work” suffered monotony in mind as well as 
body.   58
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. II, pp. 364–5.55
 Lamarck’s account of instinctual behaviors described them as examples of such relatively fixed traits: 56
two parents who had developed similar habits and propensities could pass along the acquired changes in 
their organization to their offspring, who would then be inclined toward similar behavior. In infants the 
instincts dictated their behavior more or less mechanically, but this did not mean that Lamarck believed in 
‘innate ideas.’ See Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. II, pp. 362–4.
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy, (1914), p. 383.57
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique, Vol. 2 (1809), pp. 414–5.58
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 This was a problem Lamarck saw as an unfortunate consequence of modern industrial 
civilization.  Whereas people in a state of nature would all be more or less equally exposed to a 59
variety of experiences and influences, with civilization came the poverty of the multitude, 
reduced to “coarse and arduous work which … considerably limited their ideas.”  Repeating the 60
same actions and habits meant the vital fluids would rush through the same few tubes and 
channels in a person’s organic tissue over and over again. But variation in the motion of the vital 
fluids was what would normally drive the development and complication of the organization, 
particularly in the brain.  Instead, for those whose actions became limited and repetitive, the 61
motion of the fluids was correspondingly confined, making their habitual thoughts and actions 
become ever more entrenched. Lifestyle and organization exerted a mutual influence on each 
other, and the intellectual faculties could not develop according to their full potential. 
 This had important ramifications not just for individuals, but for human society at large. 
Over time, the tendency for civilization to limit people’s daily actions and thoughts led to a 
corresponding “scale of degrees of intelligence,” which allowed people to dominate and abuse 
one another.  Those who varied their daily activities and work would slowly strengthen and 62
develop their organs of intelligence, but those who repeated the same actions every day, whether 
by their own volition or due to circumstances outside their control, would stagnate. Lamarck 
 While Lamarck did not exclude the possibility of ‘civilized’ countries outside of Europe, in his pub59 -
lished works he was generally referring to Europeans when he discussed the state of humans in civiliza-
tion. For example, see Lamarck, Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (Paris: Deterville, 1815–
22), p. 280; passage reprinted in Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), p. 209.
 Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), p. 282.60
 Lamarck, Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivans (1802), p. 128; see also Lamarck, 61
Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. I, p. 374.
 Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), pp. 280–285; 332–3.62
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considered this scale of intelligence to be a barrier to the improvement of human society. In fact, 
he argued that diminishing the inequality in people’s intellectual faculties was the most important 
thing for humanity’s betterment (perfectionnement) and happiness.  While civilization had 63
produced a few geniuses—in Recherches (1802), Lamarck named Newton, Bacon, Montesquieu, 
and Voltaire as examples—it left “the immense multitude” vulnerable to abuse and domination 
by the more powerful few.  These variations in people’s manner of living were, for Lamarck, the 64
naturalistic explanation of social inequalities. In other words, humanity’s natural history was also 
its social history. 
 That humans were endowed with intelligence thus indicated the possibility for conscious 
self-betterment, as cultivating the right habits and environment would favorably mold their 
organization. Over time, the human species as a whole could make itself more intelligent, 
happier, and more sociable. But this was only one possible future, and Lamarck thought it would 
be difficult for those in civilization, with its strict division of labor and dully repetitive lifestyles, 
to achieve this end. While Lamarck was aware that there were other theorists who had advanced 
ideas about how best to improve society on a moral basis, he was of the opinion that they 
proceeded in ignorance if they did not take note of the insights to be derived from his natural 
history. Correctly understood, the two approaches necessarily complemented one another. “As 
the objects I am going to consider have been considered as the exclusive domain of the 
moralist,” he wrote in Histoire, “the obvious part belonging to the naturalist has not been 
 Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (1809), Vol. II, p. 345.63
 Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), p. 209.64
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sufficiently recognized.”  The naturalist’s contribution was critical for ensuring social harmony, 65
cooperation, and social progress. Without a proper physiological understanding of the origins of 
human actions and tendencies, it would be virtually impossible to direct one’s own conduct, or 
that of others, in a manner favorable to the improvement of society. 
 For Lamarck, then, biologie was bound up inextricably with social change and moral 
agency, and he was always attuned to the links he saw between the history of nature and the 
future of society. Natural and social transformation produced humans as moral agents endowed 
with free will, and humans could in turn change their own bodies and environments, continually 
re-forming and re-creating society. This was the real role of the will in biological change. 
Part III. The French context 
 My aim in this thesis is not only to provide my own reading of Lamarck, but also to 
contextualize his biological work as a response to pressing social and political issues of his day. 
Previous scholarship on the politics of Lamarck’s theories has turned up some fascinating links 
to radical and republican politics, particularly throughout the nineteenth century. Adrian 
Desmond’s landmark The Politics of Evolution (1989) explored the invocation of Lamarckism by 
working-class British radicals in the early and mid-nineteenth century, though Desmond pointed 
out that there were important distinctions between Lamarck’s actual ideas and the “cannibalized 
fragments” of them that were repurposed in pauper presses to support calls for democracy and 
anti-clericalism.  Similarly, Richard Burkhardt noted that Lamarck was associated 66
 Lamarck, Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815–22), p. 281. Original emphasis.65
 Adrian Desmond, The Politics of Evolution: Morphology, Medicine, and Reform in Radical London 66
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 4.
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posthumously with radical materialist theories of nature and life, though Burkhardt argued that 
Lamarck himself did not attach “ideas of social reform” to his own scientific work.  Burkhardt 67
and Desmond were both correct in pointing out that nineteenth-century ‘Lamarckians’ often had 
little in common with Lamarck himself, and Lamarck certainly was not anticipating British 
republican politics when he developed his transformist theory. 
 However, the focus on what Lamarck’s name meant in the British context has cost 
historians of science a fuller understanding of his place in relation to the social and political 
issues of his own time and place. This gap has been only partially addressed in literature focused 
on Lamarck. For instance, in The Age of Lamarck, Corsi noted that some French naturalists in the 
early nineteenth century argued that their studies of the nervous system and the intellectual 
faculties uniquely qualified them to offer “positive” speculations on social and political 
questions.  Lamarck was among these naturalists, and claimed in Système analytique des 68
connaissances positives de l’homme (1820) that his physiological knowledge formed the basis of 
a natural history of human society. Corsi also noted that Lamarck made several references to the 
Idéologues Anthelme Richerand (1779–1840) and Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis (1757–1808) 
from 1809 onward.  However, Corsi focused on the paleontological, geological, and anatomical 69
debates that occupied Lamarck’s contemporaries throughout Europe, and in this latter context 
Lamarck’s name was chiefly associated with transformism and his work as a botanist and 
invertebrate zoologist. 
 Burkhardt, Spirit of System (1977), p. 38.67
 Pietro Corsi, The Age of Lamarck: Evolutionary Theories in France, 1790–1830 (Berkeley: University 68
of California Press, 1988), pp. 187–8.
 Corsi, The Age of Lamarck (1988), p. 205.69
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 In this section I focus instead on French national concerns about degeneration, social 
reform, and human perfectibility. These discussions took on particular importance during the 
Revolutionary period, but were part of the French intellectual landscape throughout Lamarck’s 
life and career. In this context, natural history could be of use in solving certain specific 
problems: for example, naturalists were called on to reform and improve French agriculture.  70
However, many of these naturalists, including Lamarck, saw profound connections between the 
natural world and human society, and believed that studying humans as biological organisms also 
yielded insights into the pressing social questions of the day. 
 Lamarck drew from the political philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) to 
develop his own natural history of social inequalities, and he also wrote in response to the ideas 
of his mentor the Comte de Buffon (1707–1788), who had believed that the physical 
environment exerted direct effects on the human constitution. Thus in Lamarck’s writing, even 
social phenomena were influenced by natural factors, giving the naturalist a certain authority on 
matters of human happiness and well-being. Confronting the prevalent fear of degeneration as 
much as the optimistic hope for biological perfectability, Lamarck believed his physiological 
 Emma C. Spary, Utopia’s Garden: French Natural History from Old Regime to Revolution (Chicago: 70
University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 123–7; Michael A. Osborne, “Applied Natural History and Utili-
tarian Ideals: ‘Jacobin Science’ at the Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle, 1789–1870,” in Bryan T. Ragan & 
Elizabeth A. Williams (eds.), Recreating Authority in Revolutionary France (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rut-
gers University Press, 1992), pp. 125–6; Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility: The Sentimental 
Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 118; and 
Meghan K. Roberts, Sentimental Savants: Philosophical Families in Enlightenment France (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2016), Chapter 5).
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theories could be used to improve humanity through conscious direction of the development of 
the human species.  71
 Given Lamarck’s interest in medicine, his belief that humans were capable of voluntary 
self-improvement should be understood in light of French savants’ ongoing medical 
investigations into health as a moral state, and not just a physical one. Thus, building on the work 
of Robert A. Nye and Elizabeth A. Williams, I place Lamarck within a tradition of what Williams 
has called “anthropological medicine,” in which the intimate links between the physical and the 
moral were paramount.  Well into the nineteenth century, doctors remained intensely interested 72
in the effects of climate, environment, and social milieu on the moral condition of individual 
patients as well as the human species more generally. One of the most influential figures within 
this tradition was Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis (1757–1808), with whom Lamarck shared a 
belief in the power of the physical and moral domains to reciprocally shape one another. 
 Such a perception of the rapports between the environment and the stimulation of both 
the moral and the physiological was key to sensationalist thought, which was developed out of 
Lockean epistemology during the eighteenth century. Sensationalists believed that people’s ideas 
all took their source from sense perceptions, which meant that controlling the physical 
environment could also be a way to guide people’s thoughts and ideas. In Utopia’s Garden 
Emma C. Spary has argued that in the 1790s in particular, the sensationalist conception of the 
 On contemporary concern about degeneration see especially Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A 71
European Disorder, c. 1848–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Robert A. Nye, 
Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Degeneration (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).
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icine in France, 1750–1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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relationship between the moral and the physical provided a theoretical underpinning for the new 
Republic’s efforts to morally reform its citizens.  Cultivating and presenting the spectacle of 73
nature was a way for the state to produce enlightened people—and naturalists, including 
Lamarck, participated in this effort.  
 French naturalists thus saw numerous ways in which their scientific investigations could 
lead to social betterment, and Lamarck’s belief in the possibility of willed biological change 
needs to be understood in this context. In specialized projects, like maximizing agricultural 
productivity, as well as in the broader endeavor to manage the natural economy, naturalists had 
long since believed that their work could improve society both physically and morally.  74
Lamarck’s belief that voluntary action played a part in biological change drew from the natural 
historical, political, and medical endeavors to socially and physiologically improve the human 
race. It was thus part of a complex investigation into the transformation of both the natural world 
and human society. 
i. Progressive development and degeneration 
 Lamarck’s discussions of human intelligence and social inequality drew from the 
philosopher and political theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who had written an influential 
“Discourse on Inequality” as a submission to a 1754 prize competition held by the Academy of 
Dijon. Rousseau was interested not in “natural” (i.e., biological) inequality, but in social 
inequality, which manifested primarily as differences in wealth, power, and nobility. He argued 
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that private property underlay all social inequality; man in a state of nature acted to preserve his 
own existence, but did not seek dominance over others. Rousseau was primarily interested in the 
consequences of private property, rather than in investigating the conditions that permitted its 
appearance, but he did argue that natural man lacked reason, which he believed had developed in 
tandem with civil society. Therefore he wrote (somewhat vaguely) of the “progress through the 
successive developments of the human mind” as a “conjectural” history of inequality.   75
 Lamarck also saw inequality as a consequence of civilization, though with an emphasis 
on the effects of the ever-increasing divergence in people’s daily needs and habits.  What Gissis 76
has called Lamarck’s “hydraulic”  model of physiological change meant that he considered 77
intelligence to be the result of both the natural history of the human species, and the 
circumstances of an individual’s life. Furthermore, he argued that while intelligence in itself was 
not harmful, in civil society people’s intellectual faculties developed unequally compared to one 
another, and this caused great harm to the majority of the population, who became vulnerable to 
domination and abuse as a result.  Lamarck thus shared with Rousseau the view that civil 78
society represented a certain corruption of the more ideal state of nature, a belief that followed 
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(ed.), Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 159–60.
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from his conviction that inequality was not only undesirable, but immoral. However, Lamarck’s 
transformist approach meant that his account of social inequality was more overtly biological 
than Rousseau’s. While Lamarck did not believe that any part of living nature was absolutely 
fixed, he did see the inheritance of acquired traits as a powerful force in reshaping all aspects of 
an organism’s physiology, not least the mental and moral domain in the case of humans. His 
belief in the importance of acquired characters came not just from his studies of animals, but also 
from his early work as a botanist.  
 Natural history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was often praised in its 
“applied” forms on the basis of its cultural and agricultural utility in France.  Many zoologists 79
and botanists were therefore interested in how the manipulation of the natural world could serve 
various political and economic ends. For example, working alongside Buffon, André Thouin 
(1747–1824), the longtime head gardener at the Jardin/Muséum, established extensive 
correspondence networks beginning in the early 1770s that enabled the importation of exotic 
plants whose favorable characteristics might enrich French natural wealth.  A member of the 80
Parisian Société d’Agriculture in addition to his post at the Jardin, Thouin hoped that by 
acclimatizing foreign plants to the Parisian environment, he could revitalize French agriculture. 
This was a project that carried moral significance in both the Société and the Jardin, as 
 Michael A. Osborne, “Applied Natural History and Utilitarian Ideals: ‘Jacobin Science’ at the Muséum 79
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Rousseauist writers in particular argued that France needed “massive moral reform” and 
suggested that it could come about via a knowledge of natural history applied to agriculture.   81
 In addition to their professional relationship through the Jardin, Thouin had a close 
personal relationship with Lamarck: he served as godfather to his namesake, Lamarck’s son 
André (1781–1817), and was later one of the four naturalists who witnessed Lamarck’s will in 
1822.  His conviction in the morally curative power of natural history and agriculture was 82
therefore an important part of Lamarck’s social and intellectual milieu. Just before the 
Revolution, Thouin presented several papers to the Société Royale d’Agriculture in Paris in 
which he discussed the effects of air and soil quality on the moral and physical condition of 
society.  Similar concerns motivated Lamarck’s meteorological investigations, which he offered 83
for use by doctors in addition to farmers and mariners.   84
 Several decades later, writing to Thomas Jefferson, Thouin requested “further details on 
the moral and physical effects produced by the donation of objects of rural economy and 
agricultural instruction that you made to the Savage peoples” encountered on voyages Jefferson 
had ordered to the South Sea.  As this letter suggests, ideas about the roles of agriculture and 85
natural history in moral reform and regeneration were shaped by the observations European 
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colonists made of indigenous peoples. For example, Lamarck’s mentor the comte de Buffon 
(1707–1788), who was the intendant at the Jardin du Roi from 1739 until his death, was 
particularly interested in the natural history of the human species as an explanation for variation 
among humans. He believed that non-European peoples had emerged as a result of the 
degenerative effects of foreign climates, airs, and atmospheres. 
 However, Buffon considered such environmental factors to be hyperlocalized, and also 
turned his naturalist’s gaze toward the French at home. Drawing in part from Hippocratic 
medicine, particularly in his emphasis on the effects of the “non-naturals” (airs, diet, motion and 
rest, sleep, evacuation of waste, and passions), he investigated these environmental factors as 
causes of inherited acquired changes. At his estate in Montbard, for example, he engaged in 
“marriage broking” of the peasants, hypothesizing that such ‘cross-breeding,’ even within a 
single canton, could reverse the degenerative effects of nature.  The topic of racial mixing 86
(métissage) was eventually taken up by numerous revolutionaries, including Cabanis and the 
abbé Sieyès (1748–1846), who considered various forms of selective ‘breeding’ to be promising 
for the regeneration of the French population.  87
 William Max Nelson has referred to such discourses as a “new anthropological approach” 
by which savants drew from colonial methods of observing indigenous peoples and applied them 
within France, focusing especially on rural peasants.  Statistical surveys of populations and 88
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 William Max Nelson, “Colonizing France: Revolutionary Regeneration and the First French Empire,” 87
in Desan, Hunt, and Nelson (eds.), The French Revolution in Global Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), p. 81.
 Nelson, “Colonizing France” (2013), p. 77.88
 !34
commerce had been collected in French colonies since the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
and under the Directory in particular they were increasingly deployed to study local variations in 
climate and culture in France.  New anthropological groups like the Society of the Observers of 89
Man, founded in 1800 and boasting Lamarck as a member, took particular interest in the 
populations and climates of the provinces. With a membership composed of all manner of 
naturalists and philosophes, the Society sought a Buffonian “Histoire naturelle de l’homme” that, 
as a moral science, would contribute to human welfare and social progress.  This project drew in 90
part from the sensationalist and monistic view of man espoused by Cabanis and the Idéologues.  91
However, as Jean-Luc Chappey pointed out in La Société des observateurs de l’homme (1799–
1804): Des Anthropologues au temps de Bonaparte (Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 
2002), interest in a “science of man” characterized numerous political and religious factions. 
Indeed, the Society included a robust Catholic wing, accounting for so much of its membership 
that when they abandoned it in favor of Napoleon’s new conservative regime, their absence 
contributed greatly to its demise in 1804.  
 Nevertheless French naturalists, physicians, and social reformers throughout the early 
nineteenth century remained convinced of the intimate links between people and their 
environments, and Lamarck’s propensity to offer his own prescriptions for the social body shows 
that he was aware of the potential utility of these rapports, particularly in education and 
 Nelson, “Colonizing France” (2013), pp. 83–4.89
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government. For Lamarck, guiding and shaping society was perhaps the most important applied 
use for knowledge of the natural world, and this link turned on the capacity for voluntary action. 
This is not to say that all savants saw biological change as promising a better future for 
humanity. Indeed, even among those commonly identified as Idéologues, politics varied widely. 
As Cabanis’s biographer Martin Staum has argued: “Cabanis’s heirs did not all extend the belief 
in individual perfectibility to a vision of a more enlightened society.”  To understand the range 92
of ideas about social progress and regress, it is also necessary to take note of debates in the 
medical world, in which ideas about social reform were closely linked with the study of 
physiology and the human species. This linkage made its way into Lamarck’s system most 
overtly in his citations of Cabanis.  93
i. Physiology, medicine, and inheritance 
 For Lamarck, the link between nature and physiological change was quite tangible.  
For example, when he argued in Philosophie that living bodies were literally shaped by visible 
and subtle fluids flowing into the cellular tissue from the environment, he was in effect 
 Martin S. Staum, Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution (New Jer92 -
sey: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 265.
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presenting his theory of the mechanics of the organism-environment relationship.  In his telling, 94
the consonance between a body and its milieu was simply a matter of physics. In this way his 
ideas resembled Cabanis’s. 
 But for Cabanis, physiology was also an explicitly political endeavor, one that naturalized 
his extensive program of social reform by subordinating ethics and metaphysics to the physical 
study of humanity as a part of nature.  Like the eighteenth-century agricultural reformers at the 95
Jardin, Cabanis did not just identify a correlation between physical and moral phenomena; he 
suggested that French society could be reformed by management of the physical. Cabanis’s 
belief in the importance of physiological studies for social reform hinged on his materialist-
monist view of the mind-body relationship. If the mind had no claim to independence from the 
body, then it was the physician-physiologist who could offer the greatest insights into morality 
and society, as mental phenomena depended on the physical domain. The physician thus became 
qualified to make pronouncements upon ethics, political science, and social organization by 
virtue of his expert knowledge of the mental physiology.   96
 This was not the only way in which French doctors expanded the authority and prestige 
of medicine during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, in the 1780s–
90s  the belief that physicians could diagnose social ills in addition to treating individual patients 
had spawned a genre of “medical journalism.”  For some, the Revolution itself was a curative 97
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event. In 1789, the alienist (and later Idéologue) Philippe Pinel (1745–1826), in his fifth year as 
editor of the weekly Gazette du Santé, published a November issue that claimed that nervous 
maladies had all but disappeared in Paris since the beginning of the Revolution, “doubtless 
because the indolent and apathetic sloth of the rich gave way to reborn caring and to agitations 
capable of engaging the activity of the soul … Politics has thus come to the rescue of 
medicine.”   98
 This rosy prognostication proved premature, but Cabanis, among others, continued to 
view medicine and politics as inherently linked. For Cabanis it was fairer to say that medicine 
had to come to the rescue of politics, guiding law and virtuous education on top of its capacity to 
physically improve individual patients.  Lamarck’s citations of Cabanis sometimes challenged 99
particular physiological details, but the two men shared the underlying belief that knowledge of 
humans as physical organisms was the key to moral reform and regeneration of individuals and 
their societies. From airs to location to habits, any environmental factor could contribute to 
health or illness in the body, which imbued knowledge of the natural world with profound 
medical, and therefore moral, and political significance.  This materialist turn was prevalent in 100
medicine during the eighteenth century, and scientific theories about the influence of the natural 
world on organisms expanded French doctors’ areas of therapeutic expertise and control.   101
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 By the late 1820s, physicians were also embracing the pursuit of “public hygiene and 
legal medicine,” which encompassed the reform of public institutions, management of the 
environment, and even advising the authorities on thorny moral questions in criminal issues.  102
For example, the prospectus of the Annales d’hygiène publique et de médecine légale, founded in 
1829, proclaimed that “medicine does not have as its sole object the study and cure of illness, it 
also has a close rapport with social organization; it may aid the legislator in the preparation of 
laws, it often enlightens the magistrate in their application, and it invariably looks after, along 
with the administration, the maintenance of public health.”  As doctors sought professional 103
prestige and institutional sites of practice, medicine became increasingly concerned with the 
social body, not just the individual patient.   104
 Furthermore, doctors had long been interested in patterns of familial resemblance and 
inheritance. The historian Carlos López-Beltrán has argued that the concept of biological 
heredity was solidified in the medical world; the term “hereditary” first appeared in European 
dictionaries and encyclopedias in the early eighteenth century in reference to the inheritance of 
diseases.  French physicians were particularly interested in these hereditary patterns of disease 105
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transmission, and in 1788 the Royal Academy of Medicine even sponsored an essay competition 
on the subject.  The fixation on hereditarian theories only increased following the Revolution, 106
and doctors sought to explain insanity and other social ills in addition to discrete diseases like 
tuberculosis and scrofula.  It was in this context that the naturalist Joseph-Julien Virey (1775–107
1846), who had been trained as a physician, formulated his theory of fixed physiological types 
during the 1810s–1820s.  
 Like Lamarck, Virey staked his social commentary on the claim that as an observer of the 
natural world, he had special insight into the kinds of social issues traditionally left to political 
theorists.  His theory of physiological types posited that many vices and pathologies were 108
inherited and therefore innate to the individual, a ‘fixist’ tendency that became increasingly 
prominent within hygienic science during the 1820s–30s and often led to the belief that inherited 
dispositions and diseases contributed to the degeneration of the human species.  Virey was far 109
from the first physician to express this sort of concern or to propose addressing it by selective 
‘breeding,’ a process doctors should oversee and direct.  110
 Hereditarian theories did not always center the threat of degeneration. For example, Sean 
Quinlan has pointed out the proliferation of self-help manuals that purported to teach readers 
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how to ensure “gifted, healthy, and beautiful children;” the genre was especially popular in the 
early Napoleonic years.  Addressing the environmental factors could also ensure a positive 111
future, not just prevent a negative one. Even during the Terror, the philosophe and legislator A.-
N. de Caritat de Condorcet (1743–94) had written of his hopes for the human race to reach 
perfection via proper scientific and medical management of the physical environment.  Like 112
Buffon, Condorcet generally focused on the potential positive outcomes for society of properly 
managed inheritance and hygienic medicine, as opposed to the later tendency to focus on the 
threat of inherited pathologies. But lurking behind even Condorcet’s utopian dreams was the 
implication that the health of an entire society might be threatened if the wrong characteristics 
took hold of the species by acquisition or inheritance. The hope that humans could direct their 
own species development was always accompanied by the fear of what might happen if they 
failed to do so. 
  
iii. Sensation and ideology 
 Cabanis drew his ideas about perfecting the human species in large part from the study of 
stock breeding, and inheritance thus played an important role in his thought.  However, in his 113
formulation of the inheritance of acquired characters, the environmental factors were also 
crucial. Cabanis’s empiricist thought drew from Locke’s sensationalist argument that sensory 
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impressions were the origins of all ideas, and from Destutt de Tracy’s (1754–1836) science of 
Ideology, according to which all human ideas could be studied as phenomena of sensibility.  114
The sensationalist influence shaped Cabanis’s particular methods of perfecting humans and 
human society: Ideology assumed the existence of a link between the moral and the physical that 
allowed each to exert an effect on the other, and one of the consequences was that the 
environment could profoundly change the human species. Thus for Cabanis, improving humanity 
required not just reproductive hygiene via the use of ‘breeding’ techniques, but also management 
of people’s surroundings and sensory stimulants. 
 Cabanis acknowledged the importance of many different environmental factors, including 
age, sex, temperament, and climate. Underlying all of these concerns was his conviction that 
sensitivity was the ultimate cause of all ideas. It was thus important to carefully cultivate the 
sensory impressions people were to receive, especially sights and spectacles.  The natural 115
world had a particularly important role to play: since the late eighteenth century, French natural 
historical writings, often styling themselves after Rousseau, had portrayed the contemplation of 
nature as a means by which people could morally better themselves. Indeed, the natural world 
was the source of moral sensibility in a dual sense: it provided spectacular sights that refined 
observers could gaze upon to cultivate their moral sense, and more literally it encompassed the 
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 The emphasis on sight (and by extension blindness) was shared by many French savants in the eigh115 -
teenth century, partly as a consequence of Lockean epistemology and the ‘Molyneaux problem.’ On 
Condillac’s and Rousseau’s associations of sight with self-development in their writings on educational 
reform, see Spary, Utopia’s Garden (2000), p. 196. On the broader sensationalist tendency to equate 
blindness with moral solipsism and Cartesianism, see Jessica Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility: 
The Sentimental Empiricists of the French Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); 
see especially Chapter 2. See also William R. Paulson, Enlightenment, Romanticism, and the Blind in 
France (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Mark Paterson, Seeing with the Hands: 
Blindness, Vision, and Touch after Descartes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
 !42
material basis of the moral. To study the sensory origins of ideas was also to study the sensory 
origins of virtue and good citizenship.  Organizers of the extravagant Revolutionary festivals 116
even invoked empiricist metaphors of the psyche as “soft wax” or “clay” to be “stamp[ed]” or 
“imprint[ed].”   117
 Trained as a physician, Cabanis was an influential medical reformer. His ideas about 
managing and reforming society were grounded on his physiological theories and were intended 
to effect moral change via the physical environment. This strategy included relatively 
straightforward measures, like providing hospital patients with clean, fresh air rather than 
cramped and dirty quarters. But Cabanis also argued for physicians to occupy a much larger role 
in society, including as advisers to educators and legislators. As he saw it, the physician’s art was 
to improve upon nature’s work, properly developing the faculties and even, eventually, creating 
new organs.  Thus where hereditarian theories could imply a certain inevitability of biological 118
outcomes, Cabanis also emphasized the power of the prudent physician to attend to the happiness 
and perfection of the human race. 
 Cabanisian and monistic physiological theories, which framed thought as the result of 
organized matter, did become increasingly problematic after the Revolution, as they were 
associated with political and religious instability, materialism, and liberalism.  However, as 119
Williams has pointed out, Ideology belonged to a much broader tradition of anthropological and 
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physiological medicine that persisted throughout the early nineteenth century, even as it became 
semantically fractured and mutated over time.  She identified four major characteristics of this 120
tradition: a holistic view of medicine and personhood; the belief in intimate rapports between the 
moral and the physical; a social (eventually ‘anthropological’) construction of medicine; and 
sustained interest in discerning human ‘types.’    121
 Lamarck’s insistence that subjective phenomena could be investigated as the results of 
physiological events was thus only one particular configuration of an ongoing tendency within 
French naturalism to examine the intimate relations between the moral and the physical. He was 
not advancing an absurd argument or even an original one, but was working within the 
parameters of mainstream science. It is true that his particular intellectual influences were not 
always well-received: both Napoleon and the Restoration government took issue with the 
perceived liberalism of sensationalism and Ideology, eventually leading to the 1822 suppression 
of the Faculty of Medicine. And Pietro Corsi has argued that Lamarck’s proposal, and then 
abandonment, of a new science of biologie should be understood with reference to Napoleon’s 
dislike of materialism and atheism.  Still, elements of sensationalism persisted in medical and 122
scientific studies, in part because they could be married with any number of political alignments
—that is, medical and political sensationalism were not always fully cohesive.  One example of 123
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this in Lamarck’s work is his citations of Cabanis, whom he named fourteen times throughout 
Philosophie.  However, he also included thirteen references by name to Cabanis’s much more 124
conservative disciple Anthelme Richerand (1779–1840), a ‘second-generation Idéologue’ who 
eventually slid into a reactionary ultraroyalist stance.  On certain points Lamarck even seems to 125
have read Cabanis via Richerand, rather than directly.  Nevertheless, like Cabanis, Lamarck 126
was thoroughly persuaded that species development and organic variation were of the utmost 
importance for social welfare, directing his attention to factors including the climate, 
temperature, atmosphere, place, manner of living, and daily actions and habits.   127
 Jordanova has pointed out the Idéologue influence in Lamarck’s attempts to develop a 
‘science of man,’ and suggested that he likely shared “liberal and anti-authoritarian” views with 
many Idéologues.  However, Lamarck’s own political leanings are difficult to pin down. Snait 128
Gissis has traced some of his social and scientific links to Revolutionaries and politically 
involved naturalists.  But she also noted that he was not one of the more explicitly political 129
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savants, and indeed, assessing the strength of his Republican convictions, Burkhardt 
characterized him as merely “politically prudent.”   130
 Lamarck was certainly interested in the social and political aspects of humankind insofar 
as he believed he could ground them in the positive facts of natural history. He also expressed 
that humanity’s happiness and well-being would be most improved if everyone were of roughly 
equal intelligence, and he saw this issue as following directly from civil society’s tendency 
toward divided labor. All of this suggests that he was convinced of a need for social reform, and 
he thought naturalists like himself had valuable contributions to make in any such effort. 
However, he did not fashion himself a legislator like Condorcet or a doctor-reformer like 
Cabanis.  Rather, he seems to have been more or less in agreement with some basic tenets of a 131
moderate, reform-minded liberalism. But as a Naturaliste philosophe, he placed more emphasis 
on his argument that politics ought to be founded on naturalism than he did on actually 
explicating a coherent political program. 
Conclusion 
 In this thesis I have examined the role of the will in Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s transformist 
theory, and shown that he was not merely trying to explicate an evolutionary theory of how 
species had come to exist in their present forms. Rather, we understand Lamarck best by locating 
him in the context of national concerns about social progress and degeneration. Lamarck 
 Burkhardt, Spirit of System (1977), p. 37.130
 On Cabanis’s role as a medical reformer, see Staum, Cabanis (1980), especially chapter 10; and Dora 131
Weiner, The Citizen-Patient in Revolutionary and Imperial Paris (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002).
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believed that the current state of human society was part of the natural history of the human 
species, making social commentary a legitimate part of the naturalist’s work. Further, social 
change and reform would be part of the future development of the species, giving humans a 
genuine ability to direct their own evolution. This aspect of Lamarck’s thought drew not only 
from natural historical debates about species transformation, but also from medicine, physiology, 
and empiricist epistemology. While it was certainly not his intention to attribute all species 
transformation to will or desire, the history and physiology of the will had moral and political 
significance. This fact has often been obscured by Cuvier’s caricature of voluntary species 
change, which advanced a seemingly apolitical critique that portrayed Lamarck’s ideas as 
scientifically unsound rather than engaging with their deeper social context and meaning. While 
Cuvier was certainly not the only person to propagate Lamarck’s ideas, his éloge retained a 
notable role in the historical understanding of Lamarck—partly because of his influence on Lyell 
and eventually Darwin. In truth, Cuvier’s explanation of the place of the will in Lamarck’s 
thought had little to do with Lamarck’s actual conception of it, which was formulated in the 
context of an intellectual environment in which the idea of self-directed change was neither 
absurd nor even particularly unusual. 
 In Part III I have explored some of this context, especially the influence of Rousseauian 
political philosophy and national concerns about degeneration and regeneration, which remained 
prevalent in medicine and hygiene throughout the nineteenth century. While species 
transformation was an important part of Lamarck’s thought, I believe that he should be 
understood as much more than an early evolutionist. His interest in the role of self-direction in 
species transformation was part of a broader vision of the rapports between the physical and the 
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moral. Like Cabanis, Lamarck considered these rapports to include not just the effects of the 
physical on the moral, but also vice versa—and it was by acts of will that the moral domain 
could affect the physical one. This aspect of Lamarck’s thought drew from the prevailing 
tendency to link social change with the capacity to change and direct the natural world. His 
interest in human evolution was especially driven by the belief that the biological improvement 
of the human species was key to the moral and physical regeneration of French society. 
 Understanding the role of voluntary action and self-directed change in Lamarck’s system 
thus requires a contextualist approach, not just a close reading of Lamarck’s own works. 
Lamarck’s biologie was always bound up with his interest in social change, regeneration, and 
moral agency, and he was far from alone in seeing such links between the history of nature and 
the future of society. The capacity to act by will rather than instinct gave humanity immense 
power over the natural world—including the human species itself. Natural and social 
transformation produced humans as moral agents endowed with free will, and humans could in 
turn change their own bodies and environments, continually re-forming and re-creating society.  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Appendix A: Facts and theories in European science 
 Navigating the multifaceted terrain of natural historical practice, Lamarck styled himself 
a Naturaliste philosophe, a title that led Burkhardt (1970) to argue that he was chafing against 
the “over-emphasis in contemporary science upon the importance of facts and facts alone.”  In 132
this framing, Lamarck’s problem was that he insisted on clinging to an outmoded Enlightenment 
style of naturalism that his peers were eager to dispose of by the turn of the century. Certainly 
this critique is consonant with the one Lyell offered in his Principles of Geology, in which he 
stressed the absence of “positive facts,” “well-authenticated facts,” and “positive data” at critical 
junctures in Lamarck’s argument.  Cuvier, too, had long used the demand for “positive facts” in 133
science to criticize his intellectual opponents, including Lamarck.  In his debates with Cuvier 134
during 1830, the zoologist Étienne Geoffroy St.-Hilaire (1772–1844), however, took the opposite 
approach, reflecting a sea-change in European science away from an emphasis upon mere facts, 
and toward a greater appreciation for those skilled philosophical naturalists who could derive 
from these collections the generalized laws of nature. Geoffroy thus presented himself as the 
vanguard of a reformed scientific movement that would shift attention from Cuvier’s smaller 
 Richard Burkhardt, “Lamarck, Evolution, and the Politics of Science,” Journal of the History of 132
Biology, (Autumn 1970), p. 285.
 Lyell, Principles of Geology, Vol. II (1832), pp. 1–22; see especially pp. 10–13. Readers may note the 133
irony in this charge given that, as Alistair Sponsel has shown in his recent account of Lyell in Darwin’s 
Evolving Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), Lyell himself was far from immune to 
building grand theories on the basis of what many considered to be too few facts.
 Dorinda Outram, Georges Cuvier: Vocation, Science, and Authority in Post-Revolutionary France 134
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 128–32. This shift away from an inductive science 
based on the mere observation of ‘facts’ to the derivation of generalized laws is characteristic of a broader 
epistemic shift in European science, as noted in William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1840], 2014) in England, for instance, and commented upon 
by Philip F. Rehbock in his now classic The Philosophical Naturalists: Themes in Early Nineteenth-
Century British Biology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).
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facts to the higher philosophical principles.  However, to those who sided with Cuvier, 135
Geoffroy’s repeated claim of allegiance to Lamarck only reinforced the perception that Lamarck 
was too speculative, his fanciful theories extending beyond the explanatory power of the facts 
and beyond his true areas of expertise: botany and conchology.   
 But throughout Lamarck’s career, claims to be uniquely sensitive to facts and 
observations were made by savants on virtually all sides of any given issue, and they cannot 
always be taken at face value. Lamarck himself directed a similar criticism toward Lavoisierian 
chemistry in the Hydrogéologie (1802), claiming that unlike the new chemists, he would 
consider all relevant facts before developing any systems or hypotheses. This was a typical 
posture in his transformist arguments as well: for example, Recherches (1802) opened with the 
enjoinder "to gather the observed facts and use them to discover unknown truths,”  and the 136
preface to Philosophie (1809) stressed that facts and observations formed the basis of his 
theories.  Similar claims appeared in the preface to Histoire (1815–22) and in Système 137
(1820).  In the first issue of his Journal d’histoire naturelle, published in 1792, he asserted that 138
the rapports between species and genera were “solid knowledge” because they depended on 
 Corsi, “The Revolutions of Evolution” (2011), p. 115; see also Toby Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy 135
Debate: French Biology in the Decades Before Darwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
 Lamarck, Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivans (1802), p. iv.136
 Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy (1914), pp. 7–8.137
 For example, see Lamarck, Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (1815–1822), 138
“Avertissement,” pp. i–xvi; and Lamarck, Système analytique (1820), “Discours Préliminaire,” pp. 1–6. 
Lamarck frequently reproduced passages from his own earlier works, sometimes verbatim and sometimes 
with minor revisions or additions.
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observation alone: “because true rapports are positive facts, no one could call them into 
doubt.”   139
 As Burkhardt has pointed out, such methodological claims did not necessarily correspond 
with Lamarck’s own way of practicing science.  Still, they complicate the idea that he was 140
uniquely wedded to the anachronistic “systems” of Enlightenment natural philosophy. In fact, 
throughout the eighteenth century the phrase “spirit of system” had been a favorite epithet among 
savants, “so popular and effective that everyone, on all sides of any given dispute, used it against 
everyone else.”  Cuvier’s supposedly analytical, empirical science has been contrasted with the 141
more synthetic, philosophical one favored during the Enlightenment.  But as Martin Rudwick 142
has pointed out, Cuvier himself used the term ‘facts’ with nuance, permitting some low-level 
theorizing as well as the interpretation, or “reading,” of fossils in his paleontological work.  143
‘Analytical’ and ‘synthetic’ science were not as disparate as they may first appear.  
 In light of these considerations, even Lamarck’s more incredible ideas should not be 
dismissed as the products of an overactive imagination or an antiquated focus on theories over 
facts.  Nor did they relegate him to the periphery of the savant world.  144
 Lamarck, “Sur l’étude des rapports naturels,” in Lamarck, Bruguière, Olivier, Haüy, & Pelletier (eds.), 139
Journal d’histoire naturelle (1792), pp. 365–7.
 Burkhardt, Spirit of System (1977), p. 210.140
 Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility (2002), p. 12.141
 See e.g. Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate (1987), pp. 6–7.142
 Rudwick, Georges Cuvier, Fossil Bones, and Geological Catastrophes: New Translations and 143
Interpretations of the Primary Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); see especially chapters 
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Appendix B: Climatic medicine, mesmerism, and nostalgia 
 In addition to ‘degeneration,’ climatic influences could cause specific disease states. 
Consumption of a new or strange diet might disagree with one’s constitution, and a place’s winds 
or airs could be especially hostile to newcomers and the displaced. Such beliefs coalesced in the 
disease state of nostalgia, first described in the seventeenth century as an affliction resulting from 
a spatial displacement that removed the sufferer from the environment they had grown 
accustomed to. In France it was most associated with soldiers: throughout the eighteenth century, 
French military doctors had reported that soldiers under their care, displaced from their native 
lands, were suffering from a pathological mal du pays, which could often be alleviated only by a 
return home.  The diagnosis of nostalgia thus resulted from a particular contact between the 145
naturalist’s study of the environment and the doctor’s curative mission.  
 Such a linkage can also be seen in the mesmerism of the 1780s, which purported to 
control, especially for medicinal purposes, the magnetic fluid that Mesmer claimed penetrated 
and surrounded all bodies.  Mesmerism was never widely accepted by the scientific academies, 146
but it was popular nonetheless, part of the wider trend of turning to natural historical discourses 
in service of the health of both society and the individual patient. Atmospheric influences were of 
the utmost importance in the cultivation of a healthy, revitalized nation. The popularity of 
mesmerism, and the scientific prestige of nostalgia, are indicative of some of the prevailing 
 Thomas Dodman, Homesick Epoch: Dying of Nostalgia in Post-Revolutionary France (PhD diss., 145
2011), p. 123. See also Marcel Reinhard, “Nostalgie et service militaire pendant la Révolution” Annales 
historiques de la Révolution française, (1958), pp. 1–15.
 Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Massachusetts: Harvard 146
University Press, 1968), pp. 3–4.
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natural historical beliefs driving Lamarck’s turn in the 1790s to studies of meteorology and 
weather. 
 In fact, during this period the new Republican government became particularly invested 
in the notion of a cohesive national French identity, problematizing the kinds of hyperlocal 
attachments that might produce nostalgia.  Rural young soldiers were considered particularly 147
vulnerable to the disease due to their strong regional identities and local dialects, and Bretons 
were notoriously susceptible, according to military doctors.  Interest in the political idea of 148
French identity was simultaneously spawning a new body of what William Max Nelson called 
“internal ethnographic literature,” which replicated the methods and tropes of colonial 
travelogues within the provinces.  Travel writers and revolutionaries pointed to local variations 149
in climate, temperature, language, and customs to explain both the physical and moral 
characteristics of rural French peasants.  150
 Thus Lamarck's argument in Philosophie that living bodies were (literally) shaped by 
visible and subtle fluids flowing into the cellular tissue from the environment was a naturalist’s 
explanation of an already widely accepted sociological phenomenon.  Moreover, his physical 151
and geological views were themselves indebted to a tangle of natural and moral philosophical 
ideas. Fluids were commonly invoked in natural philosophy in the eighteenth century, from fire 
 Lisa O’Sullivan, “The Time and Place of Nostalgia: Re-situating a French Disease” Journal of the 147
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, (2012), p. 629.
 O’Sullivan, “The Time and Place of Nostalgia” (2012), p. 628.148
 Nelson, “Colonizing France” (2013), pp. 75–6.149
 Nelson, “Colonizing France” (2013), p. 77.150
 See Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy (1914), pp. 188–9.151
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and gravity to light and electricity, and physiologists inspired by Newton’s theory of vision 
proposed that all ideas resulted from the physical impressions left on the nervous system by 
external objects.   In the 1780s, the mesmerists had even attached ‘mesmeric fluid’ to a 152
conception of natural law as both a physical and a normative order—a derivation of morality 
from nature.  Notwithstanding the 1784 royal commission report blaming the reactions of 153
mesmeric patients on overactive imaginations, mesmerism was immensely popular, in no small 
part due to the widespread fascination with scientific demonstrations and spectacles. The idea 
that ‘subtle fluids’ might conjoin the moral and the physical domains was not a fanciful invention 
of Lamarck’s; it drew from a number of plausible natural philosophical beliefs in the eighteenth 
century. 
 Unlike mesmerism, nostalgia did manage to secure the veneer of scientific respectability. 
By the early nineteenth century, mainstream medical Ideologue writers explicitly linked it to 
environmental and climatic concerns, arguing that it was the result of a failure to properly 
acclimatize soldiers to their new landscapes.  In this the Ideologues were genuinely influenced 154
by the neo-Hippocratic vitalist thought developed in Montpellier during the Enlightenment and 
exported to Paris as part of the landscape of anthropological medicine.  But they also sought to 155
legitimate their analytic method by invoking Hippocrates, thus anchoring themselves to a 
medical tradition that claimed ancient Greek heritage—the medical analogue to the revolutionary 
 Riskin, Science in the Age of Sensibility (2002), p. 27.152
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political tendency to appeal to Greco-Roman history.  In fact, the name of Hippocrates had 156
long been a popular one, invoked in numerous and varying medical discourses. The mesmerists 
had even claimed in the 1780s to offer a return to “natural” Hippocratic medicine and the 
idealized vision of primitive human nature they drew from Rousseau's philosophy.  Cabanis’s 157
Coup d’oeil sur les révolutions et sur la réforme de la médecine (1804) and Pinel’s Nosographie 
philosophique (1798), on the other hand, both praised Hippocrates for a method of rigorous 
observation that they proposed as a corrective to the dry, scholastic ‘textbook medicine’ favored 
by the old authorities.  158
 In Lamarck (1984), Ludmilla Jordanova identified some of the same throughlines I have 
discussed here, connecting Hippocratic climatic medicine and the Lockean-Condillacian 
epistemological tradition to Lamarck’s interest in organisms’ milieux.  However, while 159
Jordanova focused on the prevalence of these theories during the eighteenth century, the social 
diagnostics of the Ideologues continued well into the nineteenth century, and Williams has 
argued that the larger tradition they belonged to continued to exert influence in French social 
 George Rosen, “The Philosophy of Ideology and the Emergence of Modern Medicine in France” 156
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Chicago Press, 2018), pp. 6–7.
 Jordanova, Lamarck (1984), pp. 58–59.159
 !55
sciences even after 1850.  So commonplace was the association of airs and health that it 160
appeared even in Cuvier’s éloge: Lamarck’s daughter, he reported, had spent so long indoors 
caring for her father that “the first time she went outside, she was incommoded by the free air, 
having long lost use of it.”  Mesmerism, too, was intermittently revived throughout the first 161
three decades of the nineteenth century, including by Joseph Philippe François Deleuze (1753–
1835), employed since 1795 as an assistant-naturalist at the Muséum and a contemporary 
historian of the institution. The mesmerists proved such a nuisance that the Academy of 
Medicine began a new series of investigations in 1825.  162
 Ironically, while Cabanis considered the Hippocratic method important precisely because 
it directed the physician’s attention to minute differences in temperament, occupation, climate, 
and so forth, Pinel decried what he referred to as “popular and humoral medicine,” and invoked 
Hippocrates as a spectacular self-critic whose wisdom was not always to be found in his 
particular observations.  It was perhaps for this reason that nostalgia, which reeked of 163
humoralism, was initially excluded from the Nosographie philosophique. Yet in 1821, Pinel 
himself wrote the “Nostalgie” article in the Encyclopédie méthodique, nostalgia having become 
an increasingly prevalent clinical term in the intervening period.  The near-constant state of 164
war from 1792–1815 meant young medical men had frequently been drafted to military service, 
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where the nostalgia diagnosis had long thrived,  and many of these same doctors returned home 165
seeking the MD degree in the early 1800s after the army medical corps disintegrated under 
Napoleon’s stewardship.  Such former Imperial army officers were responsible for a total of 11 166
French-language medical dissertations on nostalgia submitted between Paris, Montpellier, and 
Strasbourg from 1803 to 1815; another 17 were submitted (by students with and without military 
training) between 1825 and 1835.  In these dissertations the imagination’s overwhelming 167
power to reconstruct previous experiences explained the epidemic of nostalgia in the Napoleonic 
Wars: plagued by vivid perceptions of their far-away homes, soldiers were suffering both the 
physical and psychological effects of disordered imagination.  168
 Dora Weiner, The Citizen-Patient in Revolutionary and Imperial Paris (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 165
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